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Experimental studies

  • 1 Bibliography

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    Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Bibliography

  • 2 Stevens, Stanley Smith

    [br]
    b. 4 November 1906 Ogden, Utah, USA
    d. 18 January 1973 Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA
    [br]
    American psychophysicist, proponent of " Stevens Law" of sensory magnitude, and developer of the technology of hearing and acoustics.
    [br]
    Of Mormon origins, Stevens graduated PhD in physiology from Harvard in 1933. After a further fellowship in physiology and a research fellowship in physics, he became an instructor in experimental psychology. At the beginning of the Second World War he founded the PsychoAcoustic Laboratory at Harvard, which grew into the Laboratory of Psychophysics, and in 1962 he became the first Professor of Psychophysics.
    Originally his research concentrated on sound and communication, but it later enlarged to embrace the whole range of sensory phenomena. It was his earlier studies that established the law relating sensory magnitude to stimulus magnitude. His studies of the loudness scale and its relationship to the decibel scale were significant in the development of the electronic hearing aid.
    [br]
    Principal Honours and Distinctions
    National Academy of Sciences 1946. Society of Experimental Psychologists Warren Medal 1943. American Psychological Association Science Award 1960.
    Bibliography
    1938, Hearing: Its Psychology and Physiology.
    Further Reading
    1951, Handbook of Experimental Psychology.
    MG

    Biographical history of technology > Stevens, Stanley Smith

  • 3 Cognitive Science

       The basic idea of cognitive science is that intelligent beings are semantic engines-in other words, automatic formal systems with interpretations under which they consistently make sense.... [P]eople and intelligent computers turn out to be merely different manifestations of the same underlying phenomenon. (Haugeland, 1981b, p. 31)
       2) Experimental Psychology, Theoretical Linguistics, and Computational Simulation of Cognitive Processes Are All Components of Cognitive Science
       I went away from the Symposium with a strong conviction, more intuitive than rational, that human experimental psychology, theoretical linguistics, and computer simulation of cognitive processes were all pieces of a larger whole, and that the future would see progressive elaboration and coordination of their shared concerns.... I have been working toward a cognitive science for about twenty years beginning before I knew what to call it. (G. A. Miller, 1979, p. 9)
        Cognitive Science studies the nature of cognition in human beings, other animals, and inanimate machines (if such a thing is possible). While computers are helpful within cognitive science, they are not essential to its being. A science of cognition could still be pursued even without these machines.
        Computer Science studies various kinds of problems and the use of computers to solve them, without concern for the means by which we humans might otherwise resolve them. There could be no computer science if there were no machines of this kind, because they are indispensable to its being. Artificial Intelligence is a special branch of computer science that investigates the extent to which the mental powers of human beings can be captured by means of machines.
       There could be cognitive science without artificial intelligence but there could be no artificial intelligence without cognitive science. One final caveat: In the case of an emerging new discipline such as cognitive science there is an almost irresistible temptation to identify the discipline itself (as a field of inquiry) with one of the theories that inspired it (such as the computational conception...). This, however, is a mistake. The field of inquiry (or "domain") stands to specific theories as questions stand to possible answers. The computational conception should properly be viewed as a research program in cognitive science, where "research programs" are answers that continue to attract followers. (Fetzer, 1996, pp. xvi-xvii)
       What is the nature of knowledge and how is this knowledge used? These questions lie at the core of both psychology and artificial intelligence.
       The psychologist who studies "knowledge systems" wants to know how concepts are structured in the human mind, how such concepts develop, and how they are used in understanding and behavior. The artificial intelligence researcher wants to know how to program a computer so that it can understand and interact with the outside world. The two orientations intersect when the psychologist and the computer scientist agree that the best way to approach the problem of building an intelligent machine is to emulate the human conceptual mechanisms that deal with language.... The name "cognitive science" has been used to refer to this convergence of interests in psychology and artificial intelligence....
       This working partnership in "cognitive science" does not mean that psychologists and computer scientists are developing a single comprehensive theory in which people are no different from machines. Psychology and artificial intelligence have many points of difference in methods and goals.... We simply want to work on an important area of overlapping interest, namely a theory of knowledge systems. As it turns out, this overlap is substantial. For both people and machines, each in their own way, there is a serious problem in common of making sense out of what they hear, see, or are told about the world. The conceptual apparatus necessary to perform even a partial feat of understanding is formidable and fascinating. (Schank & Abelson, 1977, pp. 1-2)
       Within the last dozen years a general change in scientific outlook has occurred, consonant with the point of view represented here. One can date the change roughly from 1956: in psychology, by the appearance of Bruner, Goodnow, and Austin's Study of Thinking and George Miller's "The Magical Number Seven"; in linguistics, by Noam Chomsky's "Three Models of Language"; and in computer science, by our own paper on the Logic Theory Machine. (Newell & Simon, 1972, p. 4)

    Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Cognitive Science

  • 4 Voelcker, John Augustus

    [br]
    b. 24 June 1854 Cirencester, England
    d. 1937 England
    [br]
    English agricultural chemist.
    [br]
    John Augustus Voelcker, as the son of Dr John Christopher Voelcker, grew up in an atmosphere of scientific agriculture and would have had contact with the leading agriculturists of the day. He was educated at University College School and then University College, London, where he obtained both a BA and a BSc Following in his father's footsteps, he studied for his PhD at Giessen University in Germany. At college he enjoyed athletics, an interest he was to pursue for the rest of his life. He decided to take up agricultural chemistry and was to succeed to all the public offices once held by his father, from whom he also took over the directorship of Woburn Farm. The experimental farm had been started in 1876 and was used to study the residual effects of chemicals in the soil. The results of these studies were used as the basis for compensation awards to tenant farmers giving up their farms. Voelcker broadened the range of studies to include trace elements in the soil, but by 1921 the Royal Agricultural Society of England had decided to give up the farm. This was a blow to Voelcker and occurred just before experiments elsewhere highlighted the importance of these elements to healthy plant growth. He continued the research at his own expense until the Rothampsted Experimental Station took over the farm in 1926. Aside from his achievements in Britain, Voelcker undertook a study tour of India in 1890, the report on which led to the appointment of an Agricultural Chemist, and the establishment of a scientific service for the Indian subcontinent.
    [br]
    Principal Honours and Distinctions
    President, Royal Society of Public Analysts. Member of Council, Chemical Society, and Institute of Chemistry. Chairman, Farmers' Club.
    Bibliography
    Most of his publications were in the Journal of the Royal Agricultural Society of England, for which he wrote an annual report, and in another series of reports relating to Woburn Farm. The Improvements of Indian Agriculture was the result of his tour in 1890.
    Further Reading
    Sir E.John Russell, A History of Agricultural Science in Great Britain.
    AP

    Biographical history of technology > Voelcker, John Augustus

  • 5 Froude, William

    SUBJECT AREA: Ports and shipping
    [br]
    b. 1810 Dartington, Devon, England
    d. 4 May 1879 Simonstown, South Africa
    [br]
    English naval architect; pioneer of experimental ship-model research.
    [br]
    Froude was educated at a preparatory school at Buckfastleigh, and then at Westminster School, London, before entering Oriel College, Oxford, to read mathematics and classics. Between 1836 and 1838 he served as a pupil civil engineer, and then he joined the staff of Isambard Kingdom Brunel on various railway engineering projects in southern England, including the South Devon Atmospheric Railway. He retired from professional work in 1846 and lived with his invalid father at Dartington Parsonage. The next twenty years, while apparently unproductive, were important to Froude as he concentrated his mind on difficult mathematical and scientific problems. Froude married in 1839 and had five children, one of whom, Robert Edmund Froude (1846–1924), was to succeed him in later years in his research work for the Admiralty. Following the death of his father, Froude moved to Paignton, and there commenced his studies on the resistance of solid bodies moving through fluids. Initially these were with hulls towed through a house roof storage tank by wires taken over a pulley and attached to falling weights, but the work became more sophisticated and was conducted on ponds and the open water of a creek near Dartmouth. Froude published work on the rolling of ships in the second volume of the Transactions of the then new Institution of Naval Architects and through this became acquainted with Sir Edward Reed. This led in 1870 to the Admiralty's offer of £2,000 towards the cost of an experimental tank for ship models at Torquay. The tank was completed in 1872 and tests were carried out on the model of HMS Greyhound following full-scale towing trials which had commenced on the actual ship the previous year. From this Froude enunciated his Law of Comparisons, which defines the rules concerning the relationship of the power required to move geometrically similar floating bodies across fluids. It enabled naval architects to predict, from a study of a much less expensive and smaller model, the resistance to motion and the power required to move a full-size ship. The work in the tank led Froude to design a model-cutting machine, dynamometers and machinery for the accurate ruling of graph paper. Froude's work, and later that of his son, was prodigious and covered many fields of ship design, including powering, propulsion, rolling, steering and stability. In only six years he had stamped his academic authority on the new science of hydrodynamics, served on many national committees and corresponded with fellow researchers throughout the world. His health suffered and he sailed for South Africa to recuperate, but he contracted dysentery and died at Simonstown. He will be remembered for all time as one of the greatest "fathers" of naval architecture.
    [br]
    Principal Honours and Distinctions
    FRS. Honorary LLD Glasgow University.
    Bibliography
    1955, The Papers of William Froude, London: Institution of Naval Architects (the Institution also published a memoir by Sir Westcott Abell and an evaluation of his work by Dr R.W.L. Gawn of the Royal Corps of Naval Constructors; this volume reprints all Froude's papers from the Institution of Naval Architects and other sources as diverse as the British Association, the Royal Society of Edinburgh and the Institution of Civil Engineers.
    Further Reading
    A.T.Crichton, 1990, "William and Robert Edmund Froude and the evolution of the ship model experimental tank", Transactions of the Newcomen Society 61:33–49.
    FMW

    Biographical history of technology > Froude, William

  • 6 Smeaton, John

    [br]
    b. 8 June 1724 Austhorpe, near Leeds, Yorkshire, England
    d. 28 October 1792 Austhorpe, near Leeds, Yorkshire, England
    [br]
    English mechanical and civil engineer.
    [br]
    As a boy, Smeaton showed mechanical ability, making for himself a number of tools and models. This practical skill was backed by a sound education, probably at Leeds Grammar School. At the age of 16 he entered his father's office; he seemed set to follow his father's profession in the law. In 1742 he went to London to continue his legal studies, but he preferred instead, with his father's reluctant permission, to set up as a scientific instrument maker and dealer and opened a shop of his own in 1748. About this time he began attending meetings of the Royal Society and presented several papers on instruments and mechanical subjects, being elected a Fellow in 1753. His interests were turning towards engineering but were informed by scientific principles grounded in careful and accurate observation.
    In 1755 the second Eddystone lighthouse, on a reef some 14 miles (23 km) off the English coast at Plymouth, was destroyed by fire. The President of the Royal Society was consulted as to a suitable engineer to undertake the task of constructing a new one, and he unhesitatingly suggested Smeaton. Work began in 1756 and was completed in three years to produce the first great wave-swept stone lighthouse. It was constructed of Portland stone blocks, shaped and pegged both together and to the base rock, and bonded by hydraulic cement, scientifically developed by Smeaton. It withstood the storms of the English Channel for over a century, but by 1876 erosion of the rock had weakened the structure and a replacement had to be built. The upper portion of Smeaton's lighthouse was re-erected on a suitable base on Plymouth Hoe, leaving the original base portion on the reef as a memorial to the engineer.
    The Eddystone lighthouse made Smeaton's reputation and from then on he was constantly in demand as a consultant in all kinds of engineering projects. He carried out a number himself, notably the 38 mile (61 km) long Forth and Clyde canal with thirty-nine locks, begun in 1768 but for financial reasons not completed until 1790. In 1774 he took charge of the Ramsgate Harbour works.
    On the mechanical side, Smeaton undertook a systematic study of water-and windmills, to determine the design and construction to achieve the greatest power output. This work issued forth as the paper "An experimental enquiry concerning the natural powers of water and wind to turn mills" and exerted a considerable influence on mill design during the early part of the Industrial Revolution. Between 1753 and 1790 Smeaton constructed no fewer than forty-four mills.
    Meanwhile, in 1756 he had returned to Austhorpe, which continued to be his home base for the rest of his life. In 1767, as a result of the disappointing performance of an engine he had been involved with at New River Head, Islington, London, Smeaton began his important study of the steam-engine. Smeaton was the first to apply scientific principles to the steam-engine and achieved the most notable improvements in its efficiency since its invention by Newcomen, until its radical overhaul by James Watt. To compare the performance of engines quantitatively, he introduced the concept of "duty", i.e. the weight of water that could be raised 1 ft (30 cm) while burning one bushel (84 lb or 38 kg) of coal. The first engine to embody his improvements was erected at Long Benton colliery in Northumberland in 1772, with a duty of 9.45 million pounds, compared to the best figure obtained previously of 7.44 million pounds. One source of heat loss he attributed to inaccurate boring of the cylinder, which he was able to improve through his close association with Carron Ironworks near Falkirk, Scotland.
    [br]
    Principal Honours and Distinctions
    FRS 1753.
    Bibliography
    1759, "An experimental enquiry concerning the natural powers of water and wind to turn mills", Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society.
    Towards the end of his life, Smeaton intended to write accounts of his many works but only completed A Narrative of the Eddystone Lighthouse, 1791, London.
    Further Reading
    S.Smiles, 1874, Lives of the Engineers: Smeaton and Rennie, London. A.W.Skempton, (ed.), 1981, John Smeaton FRS, London: Thomas Telford. L.T.C.Rolt and J.S.Allen, 1977, The Steam Engine of Thomas Newcomen, 2nd edn, Hartington: Moorland Publishing, esp. pp. 108–18 (gives a good description of his work on the steam-engine).
    LRD

    Biographical history of technology > Smeaton, John

  • 7 Trembley, Abraham

    SUBJECT AREA: Medical technology
    [br]
    b. 3 September 1710 Geneva, Switzerland
    d. 12 May 1784 Petit Sacconex, Switzerland
    [br]
    Swiss philosopher and experimental zoologist, pioneer of tissue grafting.
    [br]
    Educated at Geneva, he later became a tutor to Count Bentinck's family near Leiden. It was during this time, from 1733 to 1743, that he undertook the studies of the organism Hydra that led, in October 1742, to the first permanent graft of animal tissues. His work covered the whole range of possibilities in tissue regeneration and grafting, but he was also engaged in other studies of the protozoa and c. 1760 he made the first observations of cell division. In 1750 he was entrusted with the care of the son and heir of the Duke of Richmond and in 1757, having escorted the young duke all over the European continent, he was able to retire in comfort to the country at Petit Sacconex.
    The advice and counsel of Réaumur was of considerable support to him, bearing in mind that many including Voltaire found it impossible to accept that an animal could be multiplied by cutting it into pieces.
    [br]
    Principal Honours find Distinctions
    FRS 1743.
    Bibliography
    1744, Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire d'un genre de polypes d'eau douce, à bras en forme des cornes, Leiden.
    Further Reading
    J.R.Baker, 1952, Abraham Trembley of Geneva: Scientist and Philosopher, 1710–1784.
    MG

    Biographical history of technology > Trembley, Abraham

  • 8 Cushing, Harvey Williams

    SUBJECT AREA: Medical technology
    [br]
    b. 8 April 1869 Cleveland, Ohio, USA
    d. 7 October 1939 New Haven, Connecticut, USA
    [br]
    American neurosurgeon and innovator of antihaemorrhagic techniques including the use of electrocoagulation.
    [br]
    Cushing graduated in medicine from Harvard University in 1895, having already acquired an arts degree at Yale (1891). He held posts in Boston and at Johns Hopkins Hospital, Baltimore, from 1897 until 1890, and then travelled abroad. After studying in Germany and England he returned to Baltimore to become Assistant Professor of Surgery in 1903 working under W.S. Halsted, a post he held until 1912. In 1905 he started specializing in neurosurgery, undertaking much experimental work and developing new instruments and techniques, such as spinal anaesthesia and in particular the electrosurgical methods pioneered by W.T. Bovie.
    Returning to Harvard as Professor of Surgery, he established a renowned school of neurosurgery. He retired from Harvard in 1932, becoming Stirling Professor of Neurosurgery until 1937 and then Director of Studies in the History of Medicine at Yale.
    His researches in neurophysiology were extensive and the eponymous pituitary syndrome is only one of a large number of discoveries in the field. He was awarded numerous honours, both American and international. He was a noted bibliophile, particularly of medical books and manuscripts, and his own extensive collection was bequeathed to Yale, becoming an important part of the Historical Medical Library.
    [br]
    Bibliography
    1928, "Electrosurgery as an aid to the removal of intracranial tumours", Surg. Gynec. Obstet.
    Further Reading
    J.F.Fulton, 1946, Harvey Cushing: A Biography.
    MG

    Biographical history of technology > Cushing, Harvey Williams

  • 9 Domagk, Gerhard Johannes Paul

    SUBJECT AREA: Medical technology
    [br]
    b. 30 October 1895 Lagow, Brandenburg, Germany
    d. 24 April 1964 Burgberg, Germany
    [br]
    German physician, biochemist and pharmacologist, pioneer of antibacterial chemotherapy.
    [br]
    Domagk's studies in medicine were interrupted by the outbreak of the First World War and his service in the Army, delaying his qualification at Kiel until 1921. For a short while he worked at the University of Greifswald, but in 1925 he was appointed Reader in Pathology at the University of Munster, where he remained as Extraordinary Professor of General Pathology and Pathological Anatomy (1928) and Professor (1958).
    In 1924 he published a paper on the role of the reticulo-endothelial system against infection. This led to his appointment as Director of Research by IG Farbenindustrie in their laboratory for experimental pathology and bacteriology. The planned programme of research into potential antibacterial chemotherapeutic drugs led, via the discovery of the dye Prontosil rubrum by his colleagues, to his reporting in 1936 the clinical antistreptococcal effects of the sulphonamide drugs. These results were confirmed in other countries, but owing to problems with the Nazi authorities he was unable to receive until 1947 the Nobel Prize that he was awarded in 1939.
    Domagk turned his interest to the chemotherapy of tuberculosis, and in 1946 he was able to report the therapeutic activity of the thiosemicarbazones, which, although too toxic for general use, in their turn led to the discovery of the potent and effective isoniazid. In his later years he moved into the field of cancer chemotherapy, but interestingly he wrote, "One should not have too great expectations of the future of cytostatic agents." His only daughter was one of the first patients to have a severe streptococcal infection successfully treated with Prontosil rubrum.
    [br]
    Principal Honours and Distinctions
    Nobel Prize for Medicine 1939. Foreign Member of the Royal Society. Paul Ehrlich Gold Medal.
    Bibliography
    1935, "Ein Beitrag zur Chemotherapie der bakteriellen Infektionen", Deutsche med. Woch.
    1924, Virchows Archiv für Path. Anat. und Physiol. u.f. klin. Med. 253:294–638.
    Further Reading
    1964, Biographical Memoirs of the Royal Society: Gerhard Domagk, London.
    MG

    Biographical history of technology > Domagk, Gerhard Johannes Paul

  • 10 Fermi, Enrico

    [br]
    b. 29 September 1901 Rome, Italy
    d. 28 November 1954 Chicago, USA
    [br]
    Italian nuclear physicist.
    [br]
    Fermi was one of the most versatile of twentieth-century physicists, one of the few to excel in both theory and experiment. His greatest theoretical achievements lay in the field of statistics and his theory of beta decay. His statistics, parallel to but independent of Dirac, were the key to the modern theory of metals and the statistical modds of the atomic nucleus. On the experimental side, his most notable discoveries were artificial radioactivity produced by neutron bombardment and the realization of a controlled nuclear chain reaction, in the world's first nuclear reactor.
    Fermi received a conventional education with a chemical bias, but reached proficiency in mathematics and physics largely through his own reading. He studied at Pisa University, where he taught himself modern physics and then travelled to extend his knowledge, spending time with Max Born at Göttingen. On his return to Italy, he secured posts in Florence and, in 1927, in Rome, where he obtained the first Italian Chair in Theoretical Physics, a subject in which Italy had so far lagged behind. He helped to bring about a rebirth of physics in Italy and devoted himself to the application of statistics to his model of the atom. For this work, Fermi was awarded the Nobel Prize in Physics in 1938, but in December of that year, finding the Fascist regime uncongenial, he transferred to the USA and Columbia University. The news that nuclear fission had been achieved broke shortly before the Second World War erupted and it stimulated Fermi to consider this a way of generating secondary nuclear emission and the initiation of chain reactions. His experiments in this direction led first to the discovery of slow neutrons.
    Fermi's work assumed a more practical aspect when he was invited to join the Manhattan Project for the construction of the first atomic bomb. His small-scale work at Columbia became large-scale at Chicago University. This culminated on 2 December 1942 when the first controlled nuclear reaction took place at Stagg Field, Chicago, an historic event indeed. Later, Fermi spent most of the period from September 1944 to early 1945 at Los Alamos, New Mexico, taking part in the preparations for the first test explosion of the atomic bomb on 16 July 1945. President Truman invited Fermi to serve on his Committee to advise him on the use of the bomb. Then Chicago University established an Institute for Nuclear Studies and offered Fermi a professorship, which he took up early in 1946, spending the rest of his relatively short life there.
    [br]
    Principal Honours and Distinctions
    Nobel Prize for Physics 1938.
    Bibliography
    1962–5, Collected Papers, ed. E.Segrè et al., 2 vols, Chicago (includes a biographical introduction and bibliography).
    Further Reading
    L.Fermi, 1954, Atoms in the Family, Chicago (a personal account by his wife).
    E.Segrè, 1970, Enrico Fermi, Physicist, Chicago (deals with the more scientific aspects of his life).
    LRD

    Biographical history of technology > Fermi, Enrico

  • 11 Gilbert, Joseph Henry

    [br]
    b. 1 August 1817 Hull, England
    d. 23 December 1901 England
    [br]
    English chemist who co-established the reputation of Rothampsted Experimental Station as at the forefront of agricultural research.
    [br]
    Joseph Gilbert was the son of a congregational minister. His schooling was interrupted by the loss of an eye as the result of a shooting accident, but despite this setback he entered Glasgow University to study analytical chemistry, and then went to University College, London, where he was a fellow student of John Bennet Lawes. During his studies he visited Giessen, Germany, and worked in the laboratory of Justus von Liebig. In 1843, at the age of 26, he was hired as an assistant by Lawes, who was 29 at that time; an unbroken friendship and collaboration existed between the two until Lawes died in 1900. They began a series of experiments on grain production and grew plots under different applications of nitrogen, with control plots that received none at all. Much of the work at Rothampsted was on the nitrogen requirements of plants and how this element became available to them. The grain grown in these experiments was analyzed to determine whether nitrogen input affected grain quality. Gilbert was a methodical worker who by the time of his death had collected together some 50,000 carefully stored and recorded samples.
    [br]
    Principal Honours and Distinctions
    Knighted 1893. FRS 1860. Fellow of the Chemistry Society 1841, President 1882–3. President, Chemical Section of the British Association 1880. Sibthorpian Professor of Rural Economy, Oxford University, 1884. Honorary Professor of the Royal Agricultural College, Cirencester. Honorary member of the Royal Agricultural Society of England 1883. Royal Society Royal Medal 1867 (jointly with Lawes). Society of Arts Albert Gold Medal 1894 (jointly with Lawes). Liebig Foundation of the Royal Bavarian Academy of Science Silver Medal 1893 (jointly with Lawes).
    AP

    Biographical history of technology > Gilbert, Joseph Henry

  • 12 Hunter, John

    SUBJECT AREA: Medical technology
    [br]
    b. 14 (registered 13) February 1728 East Kilbride, Lanarkshire, Scotland
    d. 16 October 1793 London, England
    [br]
    Scottish surgeon and anatomist, pioneer of experimental methods in medicine and surgery.
    [br]
    The younger brother of William Hunter (1718–83), who was of great distinction but perhaps of slightly less achievement in similar fields, he owed much of his early experience to his brother; William, after a period at Glasgow University, moved to St George's Hospital, London. In his later teens, John assisted a brother-in-law with cabinet-making. This appears to have contributed to the lifelong mechanical skill which he displayed as a dissector and surgeon. This skill was particularly obvious when, after following William to London in 1748, he held post at a number of London teaching hospitals before moving to St George's in 1756. A short sojourn at Oxford in 1755 appears to have been unfruitful.
    Despite his deepening involvement in the study of comparative anatomy, facilitated by the purchase of animals from the Tower menagerie and travelling show people, he accepted an appointment as a staff surgeon in the Army in 1760, participating in the expedition to Belle Isle and also serving in Portugal. He returned home with over 300 specimens in 1763 and, until his appointment as Surgeon to St George's in 1768, was heavily involved in the examination of this and other material, as well as in studies of foetal testicular descent, placental circulation, the nature of pus and lymphatic circulation. In 1772 he commenced lecturing on the theory and practice of surgery, and in 1776 he was appointed Surgeon-Extraordinary to George III.
    He is rightly regarded as the founder of scientific surgery, but his knowledge was derived almost entirely from his own experiments and observations. His contemporaries did not always accept or understand the concepts which led to such aphorisms as, "to perform an operation is to mutilate a patient we cannot cure", and his written comment to his pupil Jenner: "Why think. Why not trie the experiment". His desire to establish the aetiology of gonorrhoea led to him infecting himself, as a result of which he also contracted syphilis. His ensuing account of the characteristics of the disease remains a classic of medicine, although it is likely that the sequelae of the condition brought about his death at a relatively early age. From 1773 he suffered recurrent anginal attacks of such a character that his life "was in the hands of any rascal who chose to annoy and tease him". Indeed, it was following a contradiction at a board meeting at St George's that he died.
    By 1788, with the death of Percival Pott, he had become unquestionably the leading surgeon in Britain, if not Europe. Elected to the Royal Society in 1767, the extraordinary variety of his collections, investigations and publications, as well as works such as the "Treatise on the natural history of the human teeth" (1771–8), gives testimony to his original approach involving the fundamental and inescapable relation of structure and function in both normal and disease states. The massive growth of his collections led to his acquiring two houses in Golden Square to contain them. It was his desire that after his death his collection be purchased and preserved for the nation. It contained 13,600 specimens and had cost him £70,000. After considerable delay, Par-liament voted inadequate sums for this purpose and the collection was entrusted to the recently rechartered Royal College of Surgeons of England, in whose premises this remarkable monument to the omnivorous and eclectic activities of this outstanding figure in the evolution of medicine and surgery may still be seen. Sadly, some of the collection was lost to bombing during the Second World War. His surviving papers were also extensive, but it is probable that many were destroyed in the early nineteenth century.
    [br]
    Principal Honours and Distinctions
    FRS 1767. Copley Medal 1787.
    Bibliography
    1835–7, Works, ed. J.F.Palmer, Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society, London.
    MG

    Biographical history of technology > Hunter, John

  • 13 Lodge, Sir Oliver Joseph

    [br]
    b. 12 June 1851 Penkhull, Staffordshire, England
    d. 22 August 1940 Lake, near Salisbury, Wiltshire, England
    [br]
    English physicist who perfected Branly's coherer; said to have given the first public demonstration of wireless telegraphy.
    [br]
    At the age of 8 Lodge entered Newport Grammar School, and in 1863–5 received private education at Coombs in Suffolk. He then returned to Staffordshire, where he assisted his father in the potteries by working as a book-keeper. Whilst staying with an aunt in London in 1866–7, he attended scientific lectures and became interested in physics. As a result of this and of reading copies of English Mechanic magazine, when he was back home in Hanley he began to do experiments and attended the Wedgewood Institute. Returning to London c. 1870, he studied initially at the Royal College of Science and then, from 1874, at University College, London (UCL), at the same time attending lectures at the Royal Institution.
    In 1875 he obtained his BSc, read a paper to the British Association on "Nodes and loops in chemical formulae" and became a physics demonstrator at UCL. The following year he was appointed a physics lecturer at Bedford College, completing his DSc in 1877. Three years later he became Assistant Professor of Mathematics at UCL, but in 1881, after only two years, he accepted the Chair of Experimental Physics at the new University College of Liverpool. There began a period of fruitful studies of electricity and radio transmission and reception, including development of the lightning conductor, discovery of the "coherent" effect of sparks and improvement of Branly's coherer, and, in 1894, what is said to be the first public demonstration of the transmission and reception (using a coherer) of wireless telegraphy, from Lewis's department store to the clock tower of Liverpool University's Victoria Building. On 10 May 1897 he filed a patent for selective tuning by self-in-ductance; this was before Marconi's first patent was actually published and its priority was subsequently upheld.
    In 1900 he became the first Principal of the new University of Birmingham, where he remained until his retirement in 1919. In his later years he was increasingly interested in psychical research.
    [br]
    Principal Honours and Distinctions
    Knighted 1902. FRS 1887. Royal Society Council Member 1893. President, Society for Psychical Research 1901–4, 1932. President, British Association 1913. Royal Society Rumford Medal 1898. Royal Society of Arts Albert Medal 1919. Institution of Electrical Engineers Faraday Medal 1932. Fourteen honorary degrees from British and other universities.
    Bibliography
    1875, "The flow of electricity in a plane", Philosophical Magazine (May, June and December).
    1876, "Thermo-electric phenomena", Philosophical Magazine (December). 1888, "Lightning conductors", Philosophical Magazine (August).
    1889, Modern Views of Electricity (lectures at the Royal Institution).
    10 May 1897, "Improvements in syntonized telegraphy without line wires", British patent no. 11,575, US patent no. 609,154.
    1898, "Radio waves", Philosophical Magazine (August): 227.
    1931, Past Years, An Autobiography, London: Hodder \& Stoughton.
    Further Reading
    W.P.Jolly, 1974, Sir Oliver Lodge, Psychical Resear cher and Scientist, London: Constable.
    E.Hawks, 1927, Pioneers of Wireless, London: Methuen.
    KF

    Biographical history of technology > Lodge, Sir Oliver Joseph

  • 14 Monro, Philip Peter

    SUBJECT AREA: Chemical technology
    [br]
    b. 27 May 1946 London, England
    [br]
    English biologist, inventor of a water-purification process by osmosis.
    [br]
    Monro's whole family background is engineering, an interest he did not share. Instead, he preferred biology, an enthusiasm aroused by reading the celebrated Science of Life by H.G. and G.P.Wells and Julian Huxley. Educated at a London comprehensive school, Monro found it necessary to attend evening classes while at school to take his advanced level science examinations. Lacking parental support, he could not pursue a degree course until he was 21 years old, and so he gained valuable practical experience as a research technician. He resumed his studies and took a zoology degree at Portsmouth Polytechnic. He then worked in a range of zoology and medical laboratories, culminating after twelve years as a Senior Experimental Officer at Southampton Medical School. In 1989 he relinquished his post to devote himself fall time to developing his inventions as Managing Director of Hampshire Advisory and Technical Services Ltd (HATS). Also in 1988 he obtained his PhD from Southampton University, in the field of embryology.
    Monro had meanwhile been demonstrating a talent for invention, mainly in microscopy. His most important invention, however, is of a water-purification system. The idea for it came from Michael Wilson of the Institute of Dental Surgery in London, who evolved a technique for osmotic production of sterile oral rehydration solutions, of particular use in treating infants suffering from diarrhoea in third-world countries. Monro broadened the original concept to include dried food, intravenous solutions and even dried blood. The process uses simple equipment and no external power and works as follows: a dry sugar/salts mixture is sealed in one compartment of a double bag, the common wall of which is a semipermeable membrane. Impure water is placed in the empty compartment and the water transfers across the membrane by the osmotic force of the sugar/salts. As the pores in the membrane exclude all viruses, bacteria and their toxins, a sterile solution is produced.
    With the help of a research fellowship granted for humanitarian reasons at King Alfred College, Winchester, the invention was developed to functional prototype stage in 1993, with worldwide patent protection. Commercial production was expected to follow, if sufficient financial backing were forthcoming. The process is not intended to replace large installations, but will revolutionize the small-scale production of sterile water in scattered third-world communities and in disaster areas where normal services have been disrupted.
    HATS was awarded First Prize in the small business category and was overall prize winner in the Toshiba Year of Invention, received a NatWest/BP award for technology and a Prince of Wales Award for Innovation.
    [br]
    Bibliography
    1993, with M.Wilson and W.A.M.Cutting, "Osmotic production of sterile oral rehydration solutions", Tropical Doctor 23:69–72.
    LRD

    Biographical history of technology > Monro, Philip Peter

  • 15 Petty, Sir William

    SUBJECT AREA: Medical technology
    [br]
    b. 26 May 1623 Romsey, Hampshire, England
    d. 16 December 1687 London, England
    [br]
    English scientist, medical practitioner, researcher and founder member of the Royal Society of London.
    [br]
    Despite coming from modest circumstances, Petty had an illustrious career, which started with college in France at the age of 13, followed by service on a small coastal ship and then studies at the medical schools of Ley den and Paris. In 1651 he was appointed Professor of Anatomy at Oxford, and by this time was attending meetings of fellow scientists and philosophers which culminated in the founding of the Royal Society of London for Improving Natural Knowledge. In 1652 Petty was sent to Ireland as PhysicianGeneral for the Army; he was soon involved in many matters of an intellectual and experimental nature. He took responsibility for the first proper survey of the country and produced maps and an Irish atlas, Hiberniae Delineatio, published in 1685. His investigations into political economics had a profound effect on seventeenth-century thinking. Of equal importance were his radical proposals for ship design; he presented many papers on naval architecture to the Royal Society and at one time suggested floating harbours similar to the Mulberry harbours of nearly three centuries later. In 1662 he built the pioneer catamaran Invention II (described at the time as a double-bottomed ship!), which was capable of lifting 5 tons of cargo.
    [br]
    Principal Honours and Distinctions
    Knighted 1661.
    Further Reading
    P.G.Dale, 1987, Sir W.P. of Romsey, Romsey: LTVAS Group.
    FMW

    Biographical history of technology > Petty, Sir William

  • 16 Preece, Sir William Henry

    [br]
    b. 15 February 1834 Bryn Helen, Gwynedd, Wales
    d. 6 November 1913 Penrhos, Gwynedd, Wales
    [br]
    Welsh electrical engineer who greatly furthered the development and use of wireless telegraphy and the telephone in Britain, dominating British Post Office engineering during the last two decades of the nineteenth century.
    [br]
    After education at King's College, London, in 1852 Preece entered the office of Edwin Clark with the intention of becoming a civil engineer, but graduate studies at the Royal Institution under Faraday fired his enthusiasm for things electrical. His earliest work, as connected with telegraphy and in particular its application for securing the safe working of railways; in 1853 he obtained an appointment with the Electric and National Telegraph Company. In 1856 he became Superintendent of that company's southern district, but four years later he moved to telegraph work with the London and South West Railway. From 1858 to 1862 he was also Engineer to the Channel Islands Telegraph Company. When the various telegraph companies in Britain were transferred to the State in 1870, Preece became a Divisional Engineer in the General Post Office (GPO). Promotion followed in 1877, when he was appointed Chief Electrician to the Post Office. One of the first specimens of Bell's telephone was brought to England by Preece and exhibited at the British Association meeting in 1877. From 1892 to 1899 he served as Engineer-in-Chief to the Post Office. During this time he made a number of important contributions to telegraphy, including the use of water as part of telegraph circuits across the Solent (1882) and the Bristol Channel (1888). He also discovered the existence of inductive effects between parallel wires, and with Fleming showed that a current (thermionic) flowed between the hot filament and a cold conductor in an incandescent lamp.
    Preece was distinguished by his administrative ability, some scientific insight, considerable engineering intuition and immense energy. He held erroneous views about telephone transmission and, not accepting the work of Oliver Heaviside, made many errors when planning trunk circuits. Prior to the successful use of Hertzian waves for wireless communication Preece carried out experiments, often on a large scale, in attempts at wireless communication by inductive methods. These became of historic interest only when the work of Maxwell and Hertz was developed by Guglielmo Marconi. It is to Preece that credit should be given for encouraging Marconi in 1896 and collaborating with him in his early experimental work on radio telegraphy.
    While still employed by the Post Office, Preece contributed to the development of numerous early public electricity schemes, acting as Consultant and often supervising their construction. At Worcester he was responsible for Britain's largest nineteenth-century public hydro-electric station. He received a knighthood on his retirement in 1899, after which he continued his consulting practice in association with his two sons and Major Philip Cardew. Preece contributed some 136 papers and printed lectures to scientific journals, ninety-nine during the period 1877 to 1894.
    [br]
    Principal Honours and Distinctions
    CB 1894. Knighted (KCB) 1899. FRS 1881. President, Society of Telegraph Engineers, 1880. President, Institution of Electrical Engineers 1880, 1893. President, Institution of Civil Engineers 1898–9. Chairman, Royal Society of Arts 1901–2.
    Bibliography
    Preece produced numerous papers on telegraphy and telephony that were presented as Royal Institution Lectures (see Royal Institution Library of Science, 1974) or as British Association reports.
    1862–3, "Railway telegraphs and the application of electricity to the signaling and working of trains", Proceedings of the ICE 22:167–93.
    Eleven editions of Telegraphy (with J.Sivewright), London, 1870, were published by 1895.
    1883, "Molecular radiation in incandescent lamps", Proceedings of the Physical Society 5: 283.
    1885. "Molecular shadows in incandescent lamps". Proceedings of the Physical Society 7: 178.
    1886. "Electric induction between wires and wires", British Association Report. 1889, with J.Maier, The Telephone.
    1894, "Electric signalling without wires", RSA Journal.
    Further Reading
    J.J.Fahie, 1899, History of Wireless Telegraphy 1838–1899, Edinburgh: Blackwood. E.Hawkes, 1927, Pioneers of Wireless, London: Methuen.
    E.C.Baker, 1976, Sir William Preece, F.R.S. Victorian Engineer Extraordinary, London (a detailed biography with an appended list of his patents, principal lectures and publications).
    D.G.Tucker, 1981–2, "Sir William Preece (1834–1913)", Transactions of the Newcomen Society 53:119–36 (a critical review with a summary of his consultancies).
    GW / KF

    Biographical history of technology > Preece, Sir William Henry

  • 17 Szilard, Leo

    SUBJECT AREA: Weapons and armour
    [br]
    b. 11 February 1898 Budapest, Hungary
    d. 30 May 1964 La Jolla, California, USA
    [br]
    Hungarian (naturalized American in 1943) nuclear-and biophysicist.
    [br]
    The son of an engineer, Szilard, after service in the Austro-Hungarian army during the First World War, studied electrical engineering at the University of Berlin. Obtaining his doctorate there in 1922, he joined the faculty and concentrated his studies on thermodynamics. He later began to develop an interest in nuclear physics, and in 1933, shortly after Hitler came to power, Szilard emigrated to Britain because of his Jewish heritage.
    In 1934 he conceived the idea of a nuclear chain reaction through the breakdown of beryllium into helium and took out a British patent on it, but later realized that this process would not work. In 1937 he moved to the USA and continued his research at the University of Columbia, and the following year Hahn and Meitner discovered nuclear fission with uranium; this gave Szilard the breakthrough he needed. In 1939 he realized that a nuclear chain reaction could be produced through nuclear fission and that a weapon with many times the destructive power of the conventional high-explosive bomb could be produced. Only too aware of the progress being made by German nuclear scientists, he believed that it was essential that the USA should create an atomic bomb before Hitler. Consequently he drafted a letter to President Roosevelt that summer and, with two fellow Hungarian émigrés, persuaded Albert Einstein to sign it. The result was the setting up of the Uranium Committee.
    It was not, however, until December 1941 that active steps began to be taken to produce such a weapon and it was a further nine months before the project was properly co-ordinated under the umbrella of the Manhattan Project. In the meantime, Szilard moved to join Enrico Fermi at the University of Chicago and it was here, at the end of 1942, in a squash court under the football stadium, that they successfully developed the world's first self-sustaining nuclear reactor. Szilard, who became an American citizen in 1943, continued to work on the Manhattan Project. In 1945, however, when the Western Allies began to believe that only the atomic bomb could bring the war against Japan to an end, Szilard and a number of other Manhattan Project scientists objected that it would be immoral to use it against populated targets.
    Although he would continue to campaign against nuclear warfare for the rest of his life, Szilard now abandoned nuclear research. In 1946 he became Professor of Biophysics at the University of Chicago and devoted himself to experimental work on bacterial mutations and biochemical mechanisms, as well as theoretical research on ageing and memory.
    [br]
    Principal Honours and Distinctions
    Atoms for Peace award 1959.
    Further Reading
    Kosta Tsipis, 1985, Understanding Nuclear Weapons, London: Wildwood House, pp. 16–19, 26, 28, 32 (a brief account of his work on the atomic bomb).
    A collection of his correspondence and memories was brought out by Spencer Weart and Gertrud W.Szilard in 1978.
    CM

    Biographical history of technology > Szilard, Leo

  • 18 Watson-Watt, Sir Robert Alexander

    [br]
    b. 13 April 1892 Brechin, Angus, Scotland
    d. 6 December 1973 Inverness, Scotland
    [br]
    Scottish engineer and scientific adviser known for his work on radar.
    [br]
    Following education at Brechin High School, Watson-Watt entered University College, Dundee (then a part of the University of St Andrews), obtaining a BSc in engineering in 1912. From 1912 until 1921 he was Assistant to the Professor of Natural Philosophy at St Andrews, but during the First World War he also held various posts in the Meteorological Office. During. this time, in 1916 he proposed the use of cathode ray oscillographs for radio-direction-finding displays. He joined the newly formed Radio Research Station at Slough when it was opened in 1924, and 3 years later, when it amalgamated with the Radio Section of the National Physical Laboratory, he became Superintendent at Slough. At this time he proposed the name "ionosphere" for the ionized layer in the upper atmosphere. With E.V. Appleton and J.F.Herd he developed the "squegger" hard-valve transformer-coupled timebase and with the latter devised a direction-finding radio-goniometer.
    In 1933 he was asked to investigate possible aircraft counter-measures. He soon showed that it was impossible to make the wished-for radio "death-ray", but had the idea of using the detection of reflected radio-waves as a means of monitoring the approach of enemy aircraft. With six assistants he developed this idea and constructed an experimental system of radar (RAdio Detection And Ranging) in which arrays of aerials were used to detect the reflected signals and deduce the bearing and height. To realize a practical system, in September 1936 he was appointed Director of the Bawdsey Research Station near Felixstowe and carried out operational studies of radar. The result was that within two years the East Coast of the British Isles was equipped with a network of radar transmitters and receivers working in the 7–14 metre band—the so-called "chain-home" system—which did so much to assist the efficient deployment of RAF Fighter Command against German bombing raids on Britain in the early years of the Second World War.
    In 1938 he moved to the Air Ministry as Director of Communications Development, becoming Scientific Adviser to the Air Ministry and Ministry of Aircraft Production in 1940, then Deputy Chairman of the War Cabinet Radio Board in 1943. After the war he set up Sir Robert Watson-Watt \& Partners, an industrial consultant firm. He then spent some years in relative retirement in Canada, but returned to Scotland before his death.
    [br]
    Principal Honours and Distinctions
    Knighted 1942. CBE 1941. FRS 1941. US Medal of Merit 1946. Royal Society Hughes Medal 1948. Franklin Institute Elliot Cresson Medal 1957. LLD St Andrews 1943. At various times: President, Royal Meteorological Society, Institute of Navigation and Institute of Professional Civil Servants; Vice-President, American Institute of Radio Engineers.
    Bibliography
    1923, with E.V.Appleton \& J.F.Herd, British patent no. 235,254 (for the "squegger"). 1926, with J.F.Herd, "An instantaneous direction reading radio goniometer", Journal of
    the Institution of Electrical Engineers 64:611.
    1933, The Cathode Ray Oscillograph in Radio Research.
    1935, Through the Weather Hours (autobiography).
    1936, "Polarisation errors in direction finders", Wireless Engineer 13:3. 1958, Three Steps to Victory.
    1959, The Pulse of Radar.
    1961, Man's Means to his End.
    Further Reading
    S.S.Swords, 1986, Technical History of the Beginnings of Radar, Stevenage: Peter Peregrinus.
    KF

    Biographical history of technology > Watson-Watt, Sir Robert Alexander

  • 19 Artificial Intelligence

       In my opinion, none of [these programs] does even remote justice to the complexity of human mental processes. Unlike men, "artificially intelligent" programs tend to be single minded, undistractable, and unemotional. (Neisser, 1967, p. 9)
       Future progress in [artificial intelligence] will depend on the development of both practical and theoretical knowledge.... As regards theoretical knowledge, some have sought a unified theory of artificial intelligence. My view is that artificial intelligence is (or soon will be) an engineering discipline since its primary goal is to build things. (Nilsson, 1971, pp. vii-viii)
       Most workers in AI [artificial intelligence] research and in related fields confess to a pronounced feeling of disappointment in what has been achieved in the last 25 years. Workers entered the field around 1950, and even around 1960, with high hopes that are very far from being realized in 1972. In no part of the field have the discoveries made so far produced the major impact that was then promised.... In the meantime, claims and predictions regarding the potential results of AI research had been publicized which went even farther than the expectations of the majority of workers in the field, whose embarrassments have been added to by the lamentable failure of such inflated predictions....
       When able and respected scientists write in letters to the present author that AI, the major goal of computing science, represents "another step in the general process of evolution"; that possibilities in the 1980s include an all-purpose intelligence on a human-scale knowledge base; that awe-inspiring possibilities suggest themselves based on machine intelligence exceeding human intelligence by the year 2000 [one has the right to be skeptical]. (Lighthill, 1972, p. 17)
       4) Just as Astronomy Succeeded Astrology, the Discovery of Intellectual Processes in Machines Should Lead to a Science, Eventually
       Just as astronomy succeeded astrology, following Kepler's discovery of planetary regularities, the discoveries of these many principles in empirical explorations on intellectual processes in machines should lead to a science, eventually. (Minsky & Papert, 1973, p. 11)
       Many problems arise in experiments on machine intelligence because things obvious to any person are not represented in any program. One can pull with a string, but one cannot push with one.... Simple facts like these caused serious problems when Charniak attempted to extend Bobrow's "Student" program to more realistic applications, and they have not been faced up to until now. (Minsky & Papert, 1973, p. 77)
       What do we mean by [a symbolic] "description"? We do not mean to suggest that our descriptions must be made of strings of ordinary language words (although they might be). The simplest kind of description is a structure in which some features of a situation are represented by single ("primitive") symbols, and relations between those features are represented by other symbols-or by other features of the way the description is put together. (Minsky & Papert, 1973, p. 11)
       [AI is] the use of computer programs and programming techniques to cast light on the principles of intelligence in general and human thought in particular. (Boden, 1977, p. 5)
       The word you look for and hardly ever see in the early AI literature is the word knowledge. They didn't believe you have to know anything, you could always rework it all.... In fact 1967 is the turning point in my mind when there was enough feeling that the old ideas of general principles had to go.... I came up with an argument for what I called the primacy of expertise, and at the time I called the other guys the generalists. (Moses, quoted in McCorduck, 1979, pp. 228-229)
       9) Artificial Intelligence Is Psychology in a Particularly Pure and Abstract Form
       The basic idea of cognitive science is that intelligent beings are semantic engines-in other words, automatic formal systems with interpretations under which they consistently make sense. We can now see why this includes psychology and artificial intelligence on a more or less equal footing: people and intelligent computers (if and when there are any) turn out to be merely different manifestations of the same underlying phenomenon. Moreover, with universal hardware, any semantic engine can in principle be formally imitated by a computer if only the right program can be found. And that will guarantee semantic imitation as well, since (given the appropriate formal behavior) the semantics is "taking care of itself" anyway. Thus we also see why, from this perspective, artificial intelligence can be regarded as psychology in a particularly pure and abstract form. The same fundamental structures are under investigation, but in AI, all the relevant parameters are under direct experimental control (in the programming), without any messy physiology or ethics to get in the way. (Haugeland, 1981b, p. 31)
       There are many different kinds of reasoning one might imagine:
        Formal reasoning involves the syntactic manipulation of data structures to deduce new ones following prespecified rules of inference. Mathematical logic is the archetypical formal representation. Procedural reasoning uses simulation to answer questions and solve problems. When we use a program to answer What is the sum of 3 and 4? it uses, or "runs," a procedural model of arithmetic. Reasoning by analogy seems to be a very natural mode of thought for humans but, so far, difficult to accomplish in AI programs. The idea is that when you ask the question Can robins fly? the system might reason that "robins are like sparrows, and I know that sparrows can fly, so robins probably can fly."
        Generalization and abstraction are also natural reasoning process for humans that are difficult to pin down well enough to implement in a program. If one knows that Robins have wings, that Sparrows have wings, and that Blue jays have wings, eventually one will believe that All birds have wings. This capability may be at the core of most human learning, but it has not yet become a useful technique in AI.... Meta- level reasoning is demonstrated by the way one answers the question What is Paul Newman's telephone number? You might reason that "if I knew Paul Newman's number, I would know that I knew it, because it is a notable fact." This involves using "knowledge about what you know," in particular, about the extent of your knowledge and about the importance of certain facts. Recent research in psychology and AI indicates that meta-level reasoning may play a central role in human cognitive processing. (Barr & Feigenbaum, 1981, pp. 146-147)
       Suffice it to say that programs already exist that can do things-or, at the very least, appear to be beginning to do things-which ill-informed critics have asserted a priori to be impossible. Examples include: perceiving in a holistic as opposed to an atomistic way; using language creatively; translating sensibly from one language to another by way of a language-neutral semantic representation; planning acts in a broad and sketchy fashion, the details being decided only in execution; distinguishing between different species of emotional reaction according to the psychological context of the subject. (Boden, 1981, p. 33)
       Can the synthesis of Man and Machine ever be stable, or will the purely organic component become such a hindrance that it has to be discarded? If this eventually happens-and I have... good reasons for thinking that it must-we have nothing to regret and certainly nothing to fear. (Clarke, 1984, p. 243)
       The thesis of GOFAI... is not that the processes underlying intelligence can be described symbolically... but that they are symbolic. (Haugeland, 1985, p. 113)
        14) Artificial Intelligence Provides a Useful Approach to Psychological and Psychiatric Theory Formation
       It is all very well formulating psychological and psychiatric theories verbally but, when using natural language (even technical jargon), it is difficult to recognise when a theory is complete; oversights are all too easily made, gaps too readily left. This is a point which is generally recognised to be true and it is for precisely this reason that the behavioural sciences attempt to follow the natural sciences in using "classical" mathematics as a more rigorous descriptive language. However, it is an unfortunate fact that, with a few notable exceptions, there has been a marked lack of success in this application. It is my belief that a different approach-a different mathematics-is needed, and that AI provides just this approach. (Hand, quoted in Hand, 1985, pp. 6-7)
       We might distinguish among four kinds of AI.
       Research of this kind involves building and programming computers to perform tasks which, to paraphrase Marvin Minsky, would require intelligence if they were done by us. Researchers in nonpsychological AI make no claims whatsoever about the psychological realism of their programs or the devices they build, that is, about whether or not computers perform tasks as humans do.
       Research here is guided by the view that the computer is a useful tool in the study of mind. In particular, we can write computer programs or build devices that simulate alleged psychological processes in humans and then test our predictions about how the alleged processes work. We can weave these programs and devices together with other programs and devices that simulate different alleged mental processes and thereby test the degree to which the AI system as a whole simulates human mentality. According to weak psychological AI, working with computer models is a way of refining and testing hypotheses about processes that are allegedly realized in human minds.
    ... According to this view, our minds are computers and therefore can be duplicated by other computers. Sherry Turkle writes that the "real ambition is of mythic proportions, making a general purpose intelligence, a mind." (Turkle, 1984, p. 240) The authors of a major text announce that "the ultimate goal of AI research is to build a person or, more humbly, an animal." (Charniak & McDermott, 1985, p. 7)
       Research in this field, like strong psychological AI, takes seriously the functionalist view that mentality can be realized in many different types of physical devices. Suprapsychological AI, however, accuses strong psychological AI of being chauvinisticof being only interested in human intelligence! Suprapsychological AI claims to be interested in all the conceivable ways intelligence can be realized. (Flanagan, 1991, pp. 241-242)
        16) Determination of Relevance of Rules in Particular Contexts
       Even if the [rules] were stored in a context-free form the computer still couldn't use them. To do that the computer requires rules enabling it to draw on just those [ rules] which are relevant in each particular context. Determination of relevance will have to be based on further facts and rules, but the question will again arise as to which facts and rules are relevant for making each particular determination. One could always invoke further facts and rules to answer this question, but of course these must be only the relevant ones. And so it goes. It seems that AI workers will never be able to get started here unless they can settle the problem of relevance beforehand by cataloguing types of context and listing just those facts which are relevant in each. (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1986, p. 80)
       Perhaps the single most important idea to artificial intelligence is that there is no fundamental difference between form and content, that meaning can be captured in a set of symbols such as a semantic net. (G. Johnson, 1986, p. 250)
        18) The Assumption That the Mind Is a Formal System
       Artificial intelligence is based on the assumption that the mind can be described as some kind of formal system manipulating symbols that stand for things in the world. Thus it doesn't matter what the brain is made of, or what it uses for tokens in the great game of thinking. Using an equivalent set of tokens and rules, we can do thinking with a digital computer, just as we can play chess using cups, salt and pepper shakers, knives, forks, and spoons. Using the right software, one system (the mind) can be mapped into the other (the computer). (G. Johnson, 1986, p. 250)
        19) A Statement of the Primary and Secondary Purposes of Artificial Intelligence
       The primary goal of Artificial Intelligence is to make machines smarter.
       The secondary goals of Artificial Intelligence are to understand what intelligence is (the Nobel laureate purpose) and to make machines more useful (the entrepreneurial purpose). (Winston, 1987, p. 1)
       The theoretical ideas of older branches of engineering are captured in the language of mathematics. We contend that mathematical logic provides the basis for theory in AI. Although many computer scientists already count logic as fundamental to computer science in general, we put forward an even stronger form of the logic-is-important argument....
       AI deals mainly with the problem of representing and using declarative (as opposed to procedural) knowledge. Declarative knowledge is the kind that is expressed as sentences, and AI needs a language in which to state these sentences. Because the languages in which this knowledge usually is originally captured (natural languages such as English) are not suitable for computer representations, some other language with the appropriate properties must be used. It turns out, we think, that the appropriate properties include at least those that have been uppermost in the minds of logicians in their development of logical languages such as the predicate calculus. Thus, we think that any language for expressing knowledge in AI systems must be at least as expressive as the first-order predicate calculus. (Genesereth & Nilsson, 1987, p. viii)
        21) Perceptual Structures Can Be Represented as Lists of Elementary Propositions
       In artificial intelligence studies, perceptual structures are represented as assemblages of description lists, the elementary components of which are propositions asserting that certain relations hold among elements. (Chase & Simon, 1988, p. 490)
       Artificial intelligence (AI) is sometimes defined as the study of how to build and/or program computers to enable them to do the sorts of things that minds can do. Some of these things are commonly regarded as requiring intelligence: offering a medical diagnosis and/or prescription, giving legal or scientific advice, proving theorems in logic or mathematics. Others are not, because they can be done by all normal adults irrespective of educational background (and sometimes by non-human animals too), and typically involve no conscious control: seeing things in sunlight and shadows, finding a path through cluttered terrain, fitting pegs into holes, speaking one's own native tongue, and using one's common sense. Because it covers AI research dealing with both these classes of mental capacity, this definition is preferable to one describing AI as making computers do "things that would require intelligence if done by people." However, it presupposes that computers could do what minds can do, that they might really diagnose, advise, infer, and understand. One could avoid this problematic assumption (and also side-step questions about whether computers do things in the same way as we do) by defining AI instead as "the development of computers whose observable performance has features which in humans we would attribute to mental processes." This bland characterization would be acceptable to some AI workers, especially amongst those focusing on the production of technological tools for commercial purposes. But many others would favour a more controversial definition, seeing AI as the science of intelligence in general-or, more accurately, as the intellectual core of cognitive science. As such, its goal is to provide a systematic theory that can explain (and perhaps enable us to replicate) both the general categories of intentionality and the diverse psychological capacities grounded in them. (Boden, 1990b, pp. 1-2)
       Because the ability to store data somewhat corresponds to what we call memory in human beings, and because the ability to follow logical procedures somewhat corresponds to what we call reasoning in human beings, many members of the cult have concluded that what computers do somewhat corresponds to what we call thinking. It is no great difficulty to persuade the general public of that conclusion since computers process data very fast in small spaces well below the level of visibility; they do not look like other machines when they are at work. They seem to be running along as smoothly and silently as the brain does when it remembers and reasons and thinks. On the other hand, those who design and build computers know exactly how the machines are working down in the hidden depths of their semiconductors. Computers can be taken apart, scrutinized, and put back together. Their activities can be tracked, analyzed, measured, and thus clearly understood-which is far from possible with the brain. This gives rise to the tempting assumption on the part of the builders and designers that computers can tell us something about brains, indeed, that the computer can serve as a model of the mind, which then comes to be seen as some manner of information processing machine, and possibly not as good at the job as the machine. (Roszak, 1994, pp. xiv-xv)
       The inner workings of the human mind are far more intricate than the most complicated systems of modern technology. Researchers in the field of artificial intelligence have been attempting to develop programs that will enable computers to display intelligent behavior. Although this field has been an active one for more than thirty-five years and has had many notable successes, AI researchers still do not know how to create a program that matches human intelligence. No existing program can recall facts, solve problems, reason, learn, and process language with human facility. This lack of success has occurred not because computers are inferior to human brains but rather because we do not yet know in sufficient detail how intelligence is organized in the brain. (Anderson, 1995, p. 2)

    Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Artificial Intelligence

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  • Experimental evolution — In evolutionary biology, the field of experimental evolution is concerned with testing hypotheses and theories of evolution by use of controlled experiments. Evolution can be observed in the laboratory as populations adapt to new environmental… …   Wikipedia

  • experimental psychology — the branch of psychology dealing with the study of emotional and mental activity, as learning, in humans and other animals by means of experimental methods. [1875 80] * * * Branch or type of psychology concerned with employing empirical… …   Universalium

  • Isaac Newton's occult studies — Isaac Newton (1643 ndash; 1727), the noted British scientist and mathematician, wrote many works that would now be classified as occult studies. These occult works explored chronology, alchemy, and Biblical interpretation (especially of the… …   Wikipedia

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